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POLICE, STATE SECURITY FORCES AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAMBIA
Charles Mwalimu*
I. POLICE AND STATE SECURITY FORCES IN ZAMBIA
A. Introduction
Zambia was a British colony of Northern Rhodesia from 1889 to
1963.' It attained independence from Britain as a Republic within
the Commonwealth of Nations on October 24, 1964 under an In-
dependence Constitution attached to the Zambia Independence Act
of 1964.2 The Constitution of 1964 was a multi-party constitution
which lasted until 1973 when a one-party system of government was
introduced pursuant to the One Party Constitution of 1973.1 The
party presently in power is the United National Independence Party
(UNIP).4 Currently, therefore, Zambia functions with a strong ex-
ecutive presidency governed by Kenneth Kaunda, its only president
* Senior Legal Specialist, Near Eastern and African Law Division, Law Library,
Library of Congress. Ideas and opinions expressed in this study are those of the
author with no reflection on the Law Library of Congress.
The author wishes to express sincere gratitude to Dr. Munira Mwalimu for her
untiring efforts to oversee the technical outlay of this article. Our exchange of ideas
on police and human rights in Zambia has ensured clarity of subject matter. I am
deeply grateful.
To the author's knowledge, this is the first ever study on police, state security
forces and human rights practices in Zambia other than the Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices by the United States Department of State, referred to in
this article.
See generally ZAmiBA: A COUNTRY STUDY (I. Kaplan 3d ed. 1987).
2 The two were incorporated into the Zambia Independence Order in Council,
No. 1652 STAT. INST. 4477 (1963).
' ZAMBIA CONST. (1973). The text of the Constitution is appended to the Con-
stitution of Zambia Act, No. 27 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE 191 (Supp. 1973).
4 For a detailed discussion on constitutional ramifications of UNIP and the one-
party state, see generally, Mwalimu, The Influence of Constitutions on the Devel-
opment of a Nation's Law and Legal System: The Case of Zambia and Nigeria, 8
ST. Louis U. PUB L. REv. 157 (1989).
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since independence, with the advice of the Central Committee, Cabinet
and Parliament.5
B. Historical Development and Current Structure
Pre-colonial policing in Zambia functioned through unwritten cus-
tomary laws of the indigenous people.6 The advent of British colonial
rule in Northern Rhodesia altered the political landscape of the coun-
try. The British South African Company (B.S.A. Company) of Cecil
Rhodes was granted a Royal Charter in 1889. 7 This instrument rec-
ognized the authority of the Company to acquire and exploit mineral
rights in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia in exchange for
colonial armed protection against threats to local chiefs in the ter-
ritories.8 To provide this military protection, a small constabulary
was formed in 1891.9 It primarily functioned as a buffer against Arab
slave traders and protected commercial interests of the B.S.A. Com-
pany. Two sections of the constabulary, the North-Eastern and Bar-
otse Native Police, were established under the Barotseland North-
Western Rhodesia Order in Council (1899).0 In North-Eastern Rho-
desia, police were subject to the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in
Id. at 167. It is believed that article 4 of the Constitution of 1973 which
entrenched the supremacy of UNIP as the sole political party has been repealed to
accomodate the opposition parties, in particular, the Movement for Multi-Party
Democracy (MMO). However, this amendment has not been received anywhere in
the United States. Elections are scheduled to take place in October of 1991. These
elections are being conducted under the same Constitution of 1973. The party in
power is still UNIP and the infrastructure as well as institutions of government
remain the same. Essentially, no change in the conduct of the affairs of government
has been effected.
6 See generally J. CRAMER, THE WORLD's POLICE 221 (1964). Traditional forms
of police are found in well-established institutions of kingships and chieftainships
such as the Lozi of western Zambia. Reportedly, they operated under a hierarchy
of police powers from the village headman to the paramount chief. In this system,
police arrangements appear to have been based on tribal customs and practices,
effected largely by personalities of local potentates. These policing traditions were
designed for both internal and external protection as well as to maintain law and
order.
18 HERTSLET'S Comm. TREATIES 134 (1907).
See generally RuBIN, TARANrlNO AND LARKIN, CONSTITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1985).
9 STAT. L.N.W. RHOD. 1899-1901, 1 (1905). Under this law, although a majority
of the constabulary constituted an infantry unit, other members performed civil
police duties.
'o STAT. L.N.W. RHOD. 1899-1909, 7 (1910); see also High Commissioner's Pro-
clamations Nos. 15 & 19 (1901) on discipline and other provisions on the Barotse
Native Police. Id. at 15.
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Council, No.1 (1911)." It was also in 1911 that the two Rhodesias
in the East and West were fused. 12 Consequently, the Northern Rho-
desia Proclamation No. 17 (1912) 3 was issued to form a combined
civil police, designated as the Northern Rhodesia Police.
British South African Company rule lasted from 1889 to 1924.' 4
To reflect the change in government and administration from the
B.S.A. Company to direct British rule, the Northern Rhodesia Police
Ordinance, No. 16 (1926)," was issued to regulate matters regarding
police in the territory. In 1937, the Northern Rhodesia Police Force
was overhauled, evidenced in a new Northern Rhodesia Police Or-
dinance, No. 15 (1937).16
A federation uniting Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) with Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) to form the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in 1953 to last until
1963.17 As on previous occasions of administration change, a police
STAT. L.N.E. RHOD. 101 (1917).
22 No. 438 STAT. R. & 0. 85 (1911).
'3 STAT. L.N.E. RHOD. 253 (1912). It was amended by Proclamation No. 16
(1915) and effected by Proclamation No. 14 (1914) and Amendment Order in Council
(1916), which revoked section 20. The Law of 1912 superseded Proclamations Nos.
15 and 19 of 1901. Peculiarly, however, it was not mandatory under this law for
police to consent to the merger and be amenable to the Law of 1912. Where officers
opted to remain separate, they continued to be governed by the previously existing
police instruments in Barotseland or North-Eastern Rhodesia. As a result, initial
numbers of the Northern Rhodesia Police Force were very small. In 1912, for
example, this force consisted of 19 British officers and 750 enlisted Africans. For
details on the background of the Northern Rhodesia Police Force, see CRAMER,
supra note 6, at 221-226.
'4 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, No. 324 STAT. R. & 0. 395 (1924); see
also Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, No. 325, STAT. R. & 0. 407 (1924).
'" ORD. PROC. & 0. n. COUNCIL N. RHOD. 35 (1927). Under this law, police
functioned as a military force during times of war and other public emergencies.
Supreme authority was vested in the Governor-General of Northern Rhodesia. How-
ever, command, superintendence and control of the force was vested in a Com-
mandant under section 5 of the Police Ordinance (1926). The Commandant was an
appointee of the Governor General as approved by the Secretary of the Colonies
in England. This law was partial to Europeans, who readily qualified to command
ranks under section 6 of the Ordinance of 1926. In 1933, the military portion of
the Northern Rhodesia Police Force was detached from the regular police force and
designated as the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. The Civil Police Force showed an
increase in European police at 80 persons and a decrease in the African enrollment
at 447 persons. For details, see CRAMER, supra note 6, at 221-226. The Law of 1926
was consolidated in the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, 1 L.N. RHOD. Ch.
46, 393 (1930).
26 Supp. L.N. RHOD. 126 (1946).
27 No. 1199 STAT. INST. 1804 (1953); see also Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in
Council, No. 1635 STAT. INST. 3090 (1963). The Federation dissolved under Order
in Council, No. 2088 STAT. INST. 4477 (1963).
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ordinance followed: the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, No. 5
(1953), 18 was issued to cater to federal law enforcement needs in the
Northern Rhodesian territory. At independence in 1964,19 the Northern
Rhodesia Police Force became the Zambia Police Force (the Force)
under the same law of 1953.20
The Independence Constitution of 1964 in Part IX, articles 48 and
49, provided for the Zambia Police Force as an integral part of the
public service. 21 Colonial statutory regimes were modified in 1965 by
the Police Act, No. 46 (1965).22 This law forms the basis of policing
institutions in the country today. 23
The organization and administrative structures of the Zambia police
force are largely predicated on the Zambia Police Act.24 This Act
11 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch. 44, 1 (1965 ed.). In this pre- independence era, native
authorities operated largely unarmed rural police forces to maintain law and order.
Limited fiscal resources and the lack of a clearly articulated statutory authority
hampered their enforcement functions. In a large number of cases, local police
operated as messengers enforcing native authority edicts and summons. CRAMER,
supra note 6, at 221-226. The Northern Rhodesia Police Reserve, consisting of 1400
Europeans and 750 Africans, was formed in 1950 under ordinance No. 45, 2 L.N.
RHOD. Ch. 39, 1 (1964 ed).
,9 Zambia Independence Order in Council, No. 1652 STAT. INST. 3643 (1964).
20 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch. 44, 1 (1965 ed.). Under this enactment, police strength is
estimated at approximately 6000, catering to a population of about four million
people. Most expatriate officers remained on the force for a few years to ensure
continuity and the orderly transfer of police functions to Zambian forces. See
generally Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR TnO YEAR 1964 1-39 (1964).
21 1 L.Z. arts. 48-9 (rev. ed. 1972). Articles 48 and 49 of the Constitution vested
powers of appointment and disciplinary control of police in the President. As part
of his executive functions, command of the armed forces (including the Zambia
Police Force) was vested in the President alone. However, the Commissioner of
Police was in charge of day-to-day operations of the force coincident with the Police
Ordinance of 1953, still deemed applicable. See supra note 20, 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch.
44, 1-72. Furthermore, under articles 48 and 49 of the Independence Constitution
of 1964, in conjunction with article 114 (9) and (10), powers of appointment and
disciplinary control over police officers below the rank of superintendent were vested
in the Commissioner of Police.
21 Z. GOv'T GAZETrE 273-309 (Acts Supp. 1965); consolidated in 3 L.Z. Ch. 133,
1 (rev. ed. 1972); see also Amendment Act, No. 40 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 209 (Acts
Supp. 1974). The Police Reserve still functions under Act 4, 1950, 3 L.Z. Ch. 130,
1 (rev. ed. 1972).
13 Under the One Party Constitution of 1973, articles 130 (1) and (c) established
a Police and Prison Service Commission to supersede the Public Service Commission
as the controlling authority of police. However, even under the One Party Consti-
tution of 1973, power to appoint the Inspector-General of Police, who replaced the
Commissioner as the most superior police officer, was vested in the President. The
President also enjoys powers of disciplinary control and removal of the Inspector-
General and his second in command, according to article 132 (1) and (c) of the
Constitution of 1973.
24 3 L.Z. Ch. 133, 1-81 (rev. ed. 1972).
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also controls the structure, functions, and discipline of the force. 25
Hierarchy of command of the Force runs through a Constable, Cor-
poral, Sergeant, Sergeant Major, Sub-Inspector, Assistant Superin-
tendent, Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, Assistant
Commissioner, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commis-
sioner, Commissioner, Inspector General of Police, and the Presi-
dent.26 Three departments hold the structural organization together;
namely, the Administration, Technical, and Operations departments .27
The Zambia Security Intelligence Service (ZSIS) was established in
1973 .28 The ZSIS deals with matters of intelligence and other activities
pertaining to the security interests of the country pursuant to the
State Security Act of 1969 as amended, 29 together with the Preser-
vation of Public Security Act of 1960 as amended,30 and the Regu-
lations of 1964. 3 ' It consists of a director and officers as determined
by the President under section 3 of this law. Rule-making powers
25 According to section 5 of the Act, the term "security forces of Zambia" refers
to the three components of the Zambian armed forces, namely, the Army, which
may also include the National Service and Home Guards, the Air Force, and the
Zambia Police Force. A small marine force operates on lakes bordering other
countries such as Mweru with Zaire, Kariba bordering Zimbabwe, and Lake Tan-
ganyika sharing borders with Tanzania. Cooperation for purposes of law enforcement
with other sections of the armed forces is regulated through the Ministry of Home
Affairs, which is responsible for the preservation of peace, prevention and detection
of crime and apprehension of offenders.
26 Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-33 (1981).
27 See generally supra notes 28 and 29. Command of the force rests with the
Inspector-General of Police assisted by the Commissioner of Police and three Deputy
Commissioners. Each department in turn is under the command of a Senior Assistant
Commissioner of Police. The force is jurisdictionally apportioned into 13 divisions,
corresponding to the provinces of the country, which are Central, Copperbelt,
Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, North-Western, Southern and Western Provinces. The
remaining units are organized according to function, such as the Mobile Police Unit,
Training Schools, Para-Military, State House and Tazara Police for the security and
patrol of the Chinese-built Zambia-Tanzania Railway. The Police Act was amended
in 1985 by No. 23 Z. GOv'T GAZETTE 101 (Acts Supp. 1985), to establish Vigilante
Groups in the country. See also Vigilante Regulations, No. 122 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE
.323-334 (S.I. Supp. 1986). The Zambia Police Force is assisted by the Zambia
National Defense Forces, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Investigation
Team for Economy and Trade (SITET), Flying Anti-Robbery and Anti-Drug Squads,
the Office of the President, Zambia Police Force Reserve, Mine Police, and private
and security guard operations. For details, see Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1979, 1-45 (1979); see also Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1976, 1-49 (1976);
Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974).
28 Act No. 43 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 369 (Acts Supp. 1973).
29 2 L.Z. Ch. 110, 1 (rev. ed. 1972).
30 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 1 (rev. ed. 1972).
3- 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 8 [Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972).
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are vested in the President.12 A Staff Board subject to the instructions
of the Director-General appoints, promotes, and disciplines officers
in the ZSIS below the rank of Director. 3 The Board advises the
Director-General on incidental matters affecting the general welfare
of the ZSIS. 34
It should be emphasized that a close relationship is revealed between
the actions of police and the performance of a government.3 5 From
the public point of view, police performance mirrors the functions
and actions of the government. No other agency of the government
influences the development of sound constitutionalism more than the
police.
36
In Zambia, due to the strict nature of the one-party system, an
independent and impartial law enforcement system must exist. 37 With
this in mind, police independence comes only from its integrity and
desire to ensure the preservation of individual rights.38
The mandate for a police force to enforce law and order requires
a reasonable exercise of control to ensure peaceful enjoyment of
fundamental human rights. Colonial and post-colonial policing in
Zambia was and is hierarchical in nature, reflecting the British in-
fluences. State security forces are also a part of this hierarchical
system. Since Zambia has been under some form of national emer-
32 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE 191 (Acts Supp. 1973).
33 Id.
14 See generally State Security (Amendment) Act, No. 27 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 153
(Acts Supp. 1985).
31 See, e.g., Carter & Marenin, Police in the Community: Perception of a Gov-
ernment Agency in Action in Nigeria, 15 AFRICAN L. STUD. 9-28 (1977).
36 See, e.g., Carter & Marenin, The Political Role of the Police and the Nigerian
Draft Constitution, 1 NIGERIA BEHAV. SCI. J. 93-103 (1978).
17 Mwalimu, supra note 4, at 157.
11 The social milieu of police operation in Zambia is characterized by an over-
whelming increase in crime rates and other acts of anti-social behavior. See generally
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS): Daily Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa
[hereinafter FBIS: D.R.S.S.A.], Tuesday May 30, 1989, at 29-31. This atmosphere
of lawlessness coupled with the general economic hardships affecting the whole.
country exposes police to tendencies unpalatable to consonant law enforcement. For
examples of reported instances see Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1964, 1-39
(1964); see also Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974); Z. POLICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1976, 1-49 (1976); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1979: GEN. REP. AND SURVEY OF THE YEAR 1979, 1-45 (1979); Z. POLICE ANN. REP.
FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-33 (1981); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION ANN.
REP. FOR THE YEAR 1979, 1-4 (1980); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION ANN.
REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, 1-5 (1981); ANN. REP. OF THE POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-5 (1982); ANN. REP. OF THE POLICE AND PRISON
SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR 1982, 1-5 (1983).
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gency continuously since just prior to 1964, the President, police,
and state security forces enjoy extraordinary powers, including the
right to detain persons. Use of these powers in certain instances
results in abuse and infringement of individual rights.
Accountability of police and state security forces is constitutional
in nature. Case law has developed within the Zambian constitutional
framework that restricts the expansive modalities of police power and
state security forces. Administrative accountability has also developed,
as reflected in disciplinary sanctions imposed against rogue law en-
forcement agents.
The law of human rights in Zambia typifies similar regimes in
other Commonwealth African countries that limit complete enjoyment
of fundamental human rights in the interests of national security,
public order, safety, general welfare of the state, and other policy
considerations. This "misapplication" of human rights law can be
traced to colonial formulation of human rights norms as part of a
"second-tier" of states' rights, ordinarily reflected in the "public
order" laws (such as criminal law). Contemporary formulation of
human rights in Zambia and other sub-Saharan African states con-
stitutes an usurpation of individual rights by the state because these
two levels differ from one another in a basic sense-namely, fun-
damental human rights are regarded as the basis upon which all other
constitutional norms rest, while second tier norms are the basis for
government rights. To ensure that Zambia and other sub-Saharan
nations recognize the full enjoyment of basic rights, the police and
state security forces must function independently and focus on law
enforcement rather than regime protection.
C. Theoretical Antecedents of Police
A police force represents the government department established
primarily to maintain law and order. 9 The caveat in the exercise of
police authority is that reasonable control must always accompany
its practical utility. However the police force itself, following the
traditional concept of this government department, is granted dis-
cretion to determine the manner in which it safeguards both individual
rights and government security.
Applying a test of reasonableness, the police exceed their mandated
authority with actions considered arbitrary, capricious, or influenced
39 See generally WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (1984); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
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by improper motivation. Where these actions adversely affect liberties
and freedoms of individuals, they must be deemed a breach of
fundamental human rights. Furthermore, if police action is not for
the common good or the welfare of society at large, it must be
declared a violation of fundamental human rights. Finally, police
violations of laws restricting their powers are an abridgment of basic
human rights.
This article employs a standard of "reasonable control" to examine
police and state security forces in Zambia and follows a philosophy
of unrestricted enjoyment of fundamental human rights as aspects
of Zambian constitutionalism °
II: ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE AND STATE SECURITY FORCES IN
LAW AND PRACTICE
Police accountability exists in the constitutional context through
administrative regulations and through the judicial process. The courts
act as sentinels of individual liberties, ensuring that police powers
(including those of state security forces) are utilized in accordance
with the Constitution.4' Therefore, the legal accountability of any
police force is constitutional in nature. 42
40 The test of "reasonable control" regarding police powers can conceptually be
manipulated in a variety of ways to predicate other aspects of police powers. For
example, secret police and other state security forces are founded on expansive
modalities of state sovereignty in the philosophical tensions between fundamental
human rights and rights of the state. The design of these forces, though not illegal
by any means, is founded on a circumvention of the restrictive nature of the traditional
authority of police as a unit of government. This article postulates that policy
justifications emanating under notions of public security, public order and the general
welfare of the state which are otherwise impermissible from the traditional outlook
of police mandate, namely the exercise of "reasonable control" over persons, il-
lustrate the extension in scope of powers enjoyed by state security and other secret
police. Any unit of government established for the execution of secret police goals
requires a tighter process of oversight in order to monitor possible erosion of basic
individual rights. Contemporary national states invariably have blurred the requisite
distinction between the regular political functions of the executive branch of a
government and the authority of police as sentinels of law in public or civil service.
The obliteration of this necessary demarcation invites undue political interference in
the law enforcement function of police. As a result, the police force, as an organ
of the law to safeguard society, acquires an identity as an instrument of the executive
branch of government to warrant political interference. It must function as an
independent entity of the state, primarily to follow the law and not the executive
branch.




Constitutional underpinnings of this accountability give rise to
actions under tort law, administrative law, criminal law, and other
legal branches. These actions arise only to the extent that police
action has been subjected to its mandate to exercise reasonable control
over persons and property for the common good and not to protect
dominant classes. Since fundamental human rights constitute organic
norms of the Constitution, all other norms, whether issued in the
Constitution itself or purporting to follow it, must be conscionable
under the spirit of fundamental human rights provisions. Thus, the
test, is a constitutional one which ascribes legality and liability to
police and state security force actions.
In Zambia, the parameters of the police mandate are contoured
under article 26 of the Constitution, 43 balancing between individual
rights and the domain of a sovereign state. Article 26, in addition
to other articles limiting individual rights, stipulates that, notwith-
standing guaranteed rights in other articles," a law or action under
it is consistent with these provisions insofar as it is shown that this
particular law permits preemption of these rights because the country
is under a declaration of war or a state of emergency sustainable
under article 30 of the Constitution. 4 Any such law or action can
only be held invalid if it is adjudged excessive, taking into account
the test of reasonableness in view of prevailing circumstances. 46
Article 30 of the Constitution stipulates when the President may
preempt the exercise of fundamental human rights. The President
may declare that a state of emergency exists under the Emergency
Powers Act of 1964. Alternatively, the President may declare that a
situation exists which may develop into a state emergency under the
Preservation of Public Security Act .47
Under these measures, the President, police, and state security
forces enjoy extraordinary powers. Since the exercise of executive
43 Id.
" Id. Article 15 relates to the protection of the right to personal liberty; article
18 protects from deprivation of property; article 19 protects from deprivation of
privacy of home and other property; article 21 relates to the protection of freedom
of conscience; article 22 addresses protection of freedom of expression; article 23
covers protection of freedom of assembly and associations; article 24 protects freedom
of movement; and article 25 protects from discrimination on the grounds of race.
45 Id. art. 30.
46Id.
47 See generally ZAMBiA: A COUNTRY STUDY (I. Kaplan 3d ed. 1987); see also
Parker, Control of Executive Discretion Under Preventive Detention Law in Zambia,
13 COMP. & INT'L. L. J. SOUTHERN AFRICA 159 (July 1980).
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power must conform to the Constitution's boundaries, notwithstand-
ing the necessary draconian nature of such actions, a process must
be established to review exectuve action and police powers.
An accord between these two sets of values, basic individual rights
and government authority embodied in emergency executive and police
powers, has been reached in article 27 of the 1973 Constitution.4
Under this article, where a person's liberties to freely move about
are curtailed or limited in any way as a result of executive action,
the following conditions must be complied with by the detaining
authority.
First, as soon as reasonably feasible, but not in excess of fourteen
days from the date the detention commenced, the victim must be
provided with a written statement in a language he or she understands,
articulating in detail the specific grounds of detention.4 9
Second, not more than thirty days from the time the detention or
restriction began, a notice must be published in the Government
Gazette stipulating that the individual concerned is in detention.
Detaining authorities also must provide the specific provisions of a
law which permits such restriction or detention.50
Third, only after a year in confinement or detention and upon a
request from the detainee during the term of the detention, the victim's
case must be reviewed by an autonomous tribunal constituted under
law.5 Legal representation must also be provided either in the tribunal
or in the court of adjudication according to article 27 of the Con-
stitution .52
Case law has emerged under these provisions to challenge the liberal
exercise of presidential and police powers of detention. The cases are
primarily founded on notions of constitutional accountability, but
give rise to such torts as false imprisonment and malicious prose-
cution. In Banda v. Attorney General," for example, petitioner, a
suspect in a murder trial,- was detained by police under powers
ZAMBIA CONST. art. 27.
49 Id. art. 27(a).
50 Id. art. 27(b).
I' Id. art. 27(c). See also RuBN, TARANTINO & LARIN, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 52 (A.P. Blastein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1985).
52 ZAMBIA CONST. arts. 27(d)-(e). These provisions require that the detainee consult
a legal representative of her choice. The attorney appears with the victim before
the tribunal adjudicating her case. Facilities for legal representation under articles
27(d) and (e) of the Constitution are in respect to both the court and the review
tribunal.
13 1978 Z.L.R. 233 (1978).
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contained in Regulation 33(6) of the Preservation of Public Security
Regulations of 196414 for nine days and then released without being
provided grounds of detention as required by article 27 of the Con-
stitution. The petitioner successfully maintained an action against the
government for false imprisonment.55 In Mulwanda v. The People,5 6
petitioner, a Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs,
was detained by police under the same Regulation 33(6) of the Re-
gulations of 1964 for corrupt practices. The police officer who de-
tained him believed that the case was a peculiar one which demanded
similar unusual methods of investigation. The Court denounced the
officer's detention of the petitioner. 7
14 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, at 8 [Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972).
5 The Court criticized abuse of police powers under this Regulation stating:
A person may be arrested and detained under Regulation 33(6) if, and only
if, the police officer in question has reason to believe that there are grounds
which would justify the making of a Presidential order under Regulation
33(1). It is unlawful to use Regulation 33(6) for the purpose of investigating
a criminal offense unrelated to public security. It is incorrect to say that
in the case of a detention order under Regulation 33(6), the police act only
on suspicion and do not have any grounds as envisaged by article 27 and
which therefore applies only when grounds are established. As a matter of
construction of the language used, there must be grounds for the police
detention itself, and if that were not the proper construction, Regulation
33 (6) would be ultra-vires.
1978 Z.L.R. at 238.
In Mwaba v. Attorney General, 1975 Z.L.R. 218 (1975), which disapproved Chimba
& Others v. Attorney-General, 1972 Z.L.R. 165 (1972) on the same subject, the
court held that a person detained under the Preservation of Public Security Regu-
lations of 1964 does not surrender all her rights as a citizen of Zambia except those
which are vitiated by virtue of the detention. But this detention under these Re-
gulations is a mere preventive act, and no stipulations can be imposed except those
which reasonably can be adjudged to facilitate the process of detention. In Mwangala
v. Attorney-General, 1974 Z.L.R. 97 (1974), where the plaintiff was arrested by
police, kept in a prison cell for twenty-four hours, released on a police bond, and
never prosecuted, such police action was held to be an illegal act.
56 1976 Z.L.R. 133 (1976).
17 The High Court in Mulwanda's case disagreed with the police officer and his
use of police powers, warning:
This is a thoroughly reprehensive attitude which must be unreservedly
condemned. We share the deep anxiety which every right thinking member
of society must feel at the prevalence of corruption in high places, but if
the law enforcement agencies of the state knowingly resort to illegal methods
to combat this type of social evil, they simply replace it with an even
greater evil, namely an arm of the executive which regards itself as being
above and beyond the law. Far from protecting society, these methods will
inevitably lead to its destruction.
Id. at 136.
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There are also cases decided within the parameters of criminal law
and criminal procedure. For example, in Mbandangoma v. Attorney
General,58 the plaintiff successfully made a case against the police
for misuse of detention powers in a police bond. The courts strongly
reprimanded the police, cautioning that they must show justifications
to arrest the plaintiff and at the time of arrest, reasonable grounds
must exist linking the plaintiff with the offense. 9
Other than judicial accountability, the police force is subject to
administrative control under the Constitution and the Police Act.6
" 1979 Z.L.R. 45 (1979).
19 Id. at 49; see also In the Matter of the Criminal Procedure Code and In the
Matter of R.S. Siuluta & 3 Others, 1979 Z.L.R. 14 (1979). In this case, the state
admitted to the detention of the applicants while further inquiries were being made
against them. The police intended to charge them with an offense in the distant
future. Judge Hadden of the High Court found this conduct of the state improper
and a gross violation of law. Id. at 16.
60 3 L.Z. Ch. 133, 1 (rev. ed. 1972). Recall that article 27 of the Constitution
of Zambia provides caveats in the exercise of police powers which affect fundamental
human rights enumerated in articles 13 to 26. These caveats pertain to rights to life,
personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labor, inhuman treatment,
deprivation of property, privacy of home and other property, provisions to secure
protection of law, protection of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom from
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or other grounds. Under article 27, where
a person's freedom of movement is restricted or detained, the detaining authority,
which includes police and state security forces above the rank of superintendent,
must comply with a number of conditions.
In any case, article 29 of the Constitution requires that if any person alleges that
fundamental human rights provisions in articles 13 to 27 have been, are being, or
are likely to be infringed in relation to him, then such a person must apply to the
High Court for redress. Article 27 ensures compliance with the letter and spirit of
constitutional mechanisms in respect to tenets of fundamental human rights. Article
29 is the culmination of the process and practice of the arena of basic rights under
Part III of the Constitution. Should abuse by police or other authorities occur,
notwithstanding the conditions stipulated in article 27, then the person is at liberty
to seek court action.
In regard to administrative controls under the Constitution, these are mainly
reflected in the work of the Police and Prison Service Commission established under
articles 130-134 of the Constitution. Its membership is determined by the President
and therefore, members may be removed by him for inability to discharge respective
functions including misconduct in office. However, the Commission's powers are
limited to enable the President to direct the Police and Prison Service Commission
under article 131(9) and (10) of the Constitution. The President could further order
the Commission to refer any matter under its consideration to him for a determination
according to article 131 (10) of the Constitution. However, the courts have held
that once a Commission has decided that the case merits no further inquiry or
adjudication, then the matter ceases to be under consideration by the particular
Commission. Once the matter is no longer being considered by the Commission,
the President cannot exercise his constitutional powers to require the matter to be
referred to him. Kangombe v. Attorney-General, 1973 Z.L.R. 114 (1973).
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Administrative control under the above-cited Police Act by and large
constitutes internal acts of discipline. 61
Methods of administrative accountability exist in the form of su-
perior officers in the police force taking disciplinary measures against
rogue police officers under a recognized mechanism of internal dis-
cipline in conjunction with an independent commission. For example,
in 1980, 124 incidents of misconduct by police were reported, including
theft by public servants, careless driving, and others. 62 Such action
enhances the poor image of police in the minds of the public and
affects public respect for the law and government. 6 Thus far, the
work of the Police and Prison Service Commission is commendable. 64
It is true, however, that conditions under which the police operate
in Zambia and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not com-
mensurate with an effective policing system. 65
61 See Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1964, 1-39 (1964); see also, Z. POLICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1976, 1-49 (1976); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. 1979: GENERAL REP. AND SURVEY FOR THE
YEAR 1979, 1-45 (1979); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. 1980, 1-39 (1980); Z. POLICE ANN.
REP. 1981, 1-33 (1981). The 1981 report indicates on page three that 628 members
of the force were punished in police tribunals established under section 30(1) of the
Police Act of 1965 as amended.
62 Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, at 5 (1980). In 1981, criminal and
other court cases involving police numbered 112. Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE
YEAR 1981, at 4 (1982).
63 See generally Carter & Marenin, Police in the Community: Perception of a'
Government Agency in Nigeria, 15 AFRICAN L. STUD. 9 (1977).
61 For evidence of this positive performance, see POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
COMMISSION ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1979, 1 (1980); POLICE AND PRIsoN SERVICE
COMMISSION ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, 1 (1981); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1 (1982); and POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1982, 1 (1983).
65 These poor conditions include low wages, inadequate or unsavory working
conditions, inadequate transportation and poor communications equipment. These
are acknowledged by the Police and Prison Service Commission Annual Reports for
the Years 1974-82. To improve their service to the public, the security and welfare
of the police must correspondingly improve. Such improvements should reduce the
tendencies to engage in corrupt practices. The issue of corruption, not only in the
police force but also in the public service, generally is a major concern of the
government and has culminated in the Corrupt Practices Act of 1980. Z. GOV'T
GAZETTE 63 (Acts Supp. 1980). Under this Act, an Anti-Corruption Commission
controlled and supervised by the President was created. The Commission investigates
complaints and alleged conduct of any public officer suspected of engaging in corrupt
practices and initiates prosectutions in the courts. A report of such an officer is
made to the President under section 10 (1) of the Act. The Corrupt Practices Act,
supersedes the English Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916, extended to Zambia
under the English Law (Extent of Application) Act, 1963, 1 L.Z. Ch. 4, 1 (rev. ed.
1972).
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III: HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES AND THE INFLUENCE OF POLICE AND
STATE SECURITY FORCES IN ZAMBIA
A. The Law of Human Rights in Zambia
The law of human rights in Zambia is recognized, preserved, and
secured in Part III, articles 13 to 27 of the Constitution, with sup-
plementary provisions in articles 28-31.6 For the purposes of this
discussion, Part III of the Constitution of Zambia has been sub-
divided into four sections, as indicated below. Zambia was instru-
mental in the formulation of the Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights adopted by the Heads of State of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) on June 27, 1981.67 Commitment to fundamental human
rights in Zambia is also evident in serial prescription of these rights6
in the Constitution immediately subsequent to the formulations of
principles of sovereignty and citizenship.
As in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, these fundamental
human rights are abridged. For example, article 13, which declares
fundamental freedoms of life, liberty, security of the person in law,
and protection of privacy of the home and other property, is sus-
tainable only if these freedoms do not transgress on the rights and
interests of the state as contained in article 4 of the Constitution
prohibiting the formation of political parties outside the framework
of the United National Independence Party. Also, rights of any
individual must not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or
the public interest.
Although the government guarantees extensive fundamental human
rights and observes basic freedoms, due process, and individual rights,
the government nevertheless restricted political rights as a one party
state.6 9 These restrictions are manifested in a variety of ways, such
as, the large concentration of power in the hands of the President.
6ZAMiIA CONST. arts. 28-31.
67 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). The scheme of basic human rights espoused in this piece
calls for re-appraisal in the formulation of fundamental human rights initially,
followed by principles of sovereignty and citizenship. This view consonantly applies
to prescription of norms of basic rights in the Zambia Constitution. As societies
increasingly move away from regional or state identity, the suggested scheme is
appreciably more in tune with the commonality of human rights as a global tradition.
This schema is reflected in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, 1988.
" ZAMBIA CONST. arts. 13-27.
See generally U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 1979-1988.
[Vol. 21:217
ZAMBIAN HuMAN RIGHTS
Under the president's broad emergency and presidential powers,
he is at liberty to suspend "observance of human rights in the interests
of state security." 70 Through the emergency legislation "the president
has broad discretion to detain or restrict the movement of people,
and law enforcement personnel have extra-ordinary powers to detain
suspects and search homes." '7'
As a result of the ongoing state of emergency in Zambia since
1964, the President has wide powers of detention, which are readily
available to his police and state security forces. 72 In 1988, roughly
twenty people were still in detention, including eight people detained
in late 1988 for an alleged plot to overthrow the government. Although
detainees do have recourse to the courts, the legal process is generally
not expeditious .71 Between 1979 and 1988, the reports recorded no
denials of a free and public trial because the right to such a trial is
constitutionally guaranteed (except in the case of presidential detain-
ees) .74
Section Three of this part of the Zambian Constitution deals with
the governmental attitude and record concerning national, interna-
tional and non-governmental investigations of alleged human rights
violations. The government does not encourage, discourage, or impede
human rights inquiries by activists and organizations. Committed to
the principles of human rights, President Kaunda was instrumental
in seeking a mechanism in the Organization of African Unity for the
protection and preservation of human rights in Africa. Although
there are no local human rights groups in Zambia, the Law Asso-
ciation of Zambia and the University's law school cooperate in mon-
itoring human rights protection in the country. 75 In the period of
1979 to 1988,76 there is no public record of the Zambian government
70 See State Security Act, 2 L.Z. Ch. 110, 1 (rev. ed. 1973); The Preservation
of Public Security Act, 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 1 (rev. ed. (1972); Regulations of 1964, 2
L.Z. Ch. 106, 8 (Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972); Emergency Powers Act, 2 L.Z. Ch.
108, 1 (rev. ed. 1972); U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1983, 421
(1984).
7' U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988, 412 (1989). Because
of this continuous state of emergency, it is recognized generally that the gap between
rights accorded in the Constitution and those actually enjoyed by Zambians remains
to be narrowed.
72 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. PROC. 1988, 413 (1989).
71 See infra note 96.
74 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS PROC. 1988, 413 (1989).
75 Id.
76 See infra note 96.
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being subject to an international, national or regional investigation
for the violation of human rights.
In 1982, however, Amnesty International reported concern regard-
ing detentions without trial and mistreatment of prisoners in Zambia. 77
Similar concerns were expressed by Amnesty International in 1983
and 1985. Because of these concerns, Amnesty International urged
the government in 1986 to investigate allegations of the torture of
imprisoned South-African security persons. President Kaunda replied
that no torture or ill treatment had been inflicted on the South
Africans and that their cases would be reviewed by the courts in
accordance with the law.78
In regard to cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, Zambian practice between 1979 to 1988 is aptly summarized
by the Country Reports of 1988 which state:
The Constitution outlaws torture, but there are credible reports that
police and military personnel have resorted to excessive force when
interrogating detainees or prisoners. In September, 1988, a High
Court judge criticized 'overzealous' police officers and said that
innocent people were treated brutally to obtain statements of con-
fessions. Alleged abuses reported ... include beatings, the with-
holding of food, pain inflicted on various parts of the body and
long periods of solitary confinement. The courts have ordered in-
vestigations to ascertain if confessions or statements were made after
torture or mistreatment. All the Reports79 indicate that Zambian
prisons are over populated, critically understaffed, unsanitary, and
affected by the general lack of medical facilities throughout the
whole country.w°
The right of privacy in the family, in the home, and in corre-
spondence is guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the police
and state security forces must have search warrants to enter homes,
except in cases involving a state of emergency or the deportation of
an illegal alien.8' A magistrate or police officer above the rank of
17 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PROC. 1982, 366-67.
71 Id. at 354. There is no public record of the Zambian Government having been
investigated during the course of 1988. Amnesty International maintains a chapter
in Lusaka according to the U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988,
418 (1989).
79 See infra note 96.
90 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RT. PROC. 1988, 418.
SI U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS PROC. 1988, 414 (1989). Consistent
detention of persons is revealed in practically all the Country Reports covered between
1979 and 1988.
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Sub-Inspector may issue a search warrant. To obtain a search warrant,
constructive probable cause must be demonstrated, just. as in the
American system. This requirement is typically met in Zambia. 2
Section Two of this portion of the Consititution deals with human
rights practices involving the respect for civil and political liberties.83
Freedom of speech and the freedom of the press are respected as
long as they do not involve derogatory commentary about the Head
of State, the philosophy of humanism, or the one-party State. 84
Exercising freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly
is similar to exercising the right to free speech and press. In principle,
these rights were adversely affected by the nature of the political
system. Therefore, all political activism outside the ambit of the one-
party state was prohibited. 85 As a result, permits to hold public
association meetings, processions, rallies, assemblies, and other fra-
ternal gatherings must be obtained from the police as a matter of
course.86 These permits are easily secured unless the government be-
lieves that such assemblies will be disruptive and that they will des-
tablilize the local authorities. 7 The country possesses a multitude of
associations and other professional bodies. These associations function
as unofficial lobbying groups to exert pressure on the party and
government regarding numerous economic, political and social is-
sues.
81
In Zambia, the freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed
and supported by President Kaunda. A wide variety of Christian
denominations operate freely in the country. Even though the gov-
ernment specifically prohibits the Watchtower Sect (the Jehovah's
Witnesses) from conducting open air meetings and door to door
campaigns seeking converts, the Sect functions openly with other
religions. Zambia has a large population of Muslims and Hindus with
their own mosques and temples. Legal associations and religious
groups operate independently of party control or influence. President
R2 See infra note 96. Safeguards of fair and public trial as they exist at common
law also apply to Zambia in non-detention cases. When these issues are tried, the
trials are generally held in public. The Zambian judiciary is by and large known
for its independence. However, the President appoints and transfers judges.
83 Id.
91 See e.g., U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REp. HUM. RTS. PROC. 1988, 414; note
178.





GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Kaunda encourages independent community action by religious
groups .89
Another area of civil and political liberties involves the right of
unrestricted internal and external movement, which includes foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation. 90 In Zambia, the President may
restrict the movement of individuals within the country according to
his emergency powers. For example, the government consistently
prohibits foreign diplomats from traveling outside of a forty to fifty
mile radius from Lusaka without the written permission of the Min-
istry of Home Affairs. Concerning internal travel, the government
routinely uses police road blocks to conduct vehicle and passenger
search and seizures. Although the government permits emigration,
strict currency regulations, a result of adverse economic conditions,
renders it difficult. Despite the government's travel restrictions, Zam-
bia has served as a haven for refugees in the region, thereby earning
the country high praise by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR). During the war in Rhodesia, Zambia provided
refuge to more than 60,000 Rhodesian refugees. In 1980, Zambia
served as host to an estimated 17,500 refugees, including 11,000
Angolans and 4000 Namibians. Regarding foreign travel, the gov-
ernment reserves the right to refuse or withdraw a passport when an
individual's activities abroad seem to be inimical to the "interests of
the state."
The final and most important section of the Constitution involving
civil and political liberties relates to the rights of citizens to change
the government. 9' Approximately 100%0 of Zambia's adult population
are currently members of the ruling United National Independence
Party. 92 As the leader of the party and head of state, the President
possesses overwhelming powers that enable him to determine the
members of the Central Committee and the Cabinet, which are the
two premier organs of formal government. Political loyalty in both
of these institutions is exacted by a mixture of merit and tribal
balancing. All political and governmental offices at any level must
be filled by members of UNIP. In practice, however, the political
system was open to persons of divergent opinions as long as they
operate within the one party structure. 93
89 Id.
goId.
91 U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. PRAC. 1988, 419 (1989).
92 See infra note 96.
93 See REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. TH REP. OF THE SPECIAL PAR-
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In section four of this part of the Zambian Constitution, discrim-
ination on the grounds of race, gender, religion, language or social
status is dealt with. To appreciate the nature of these rights, it should
be noted that Zambia consists of seven million people with more
than seventy-two Bantu speaking ethnic groups.9 The pursuit of
equality is generally made to meet social and economic needs. How-
ever, between February and April of 1988, 203 trading licenses were
withdrawn from business persons, most of them Asians, in order to
stem black marketeering. This revocation was considered a discrim-
inatory act by most observers. 95
Thus, an interesting paradox exists within Zambia. Zambia is a
vocal supporter and strong proponent of human rights at the regional
and international levels. 96 Consequently, Zambia is in the forefront
of human rights and provides tangible support for self determination
in Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. In
addition, Zambia serves as a country of first refuge for stateless and
other displaced persons in the region. Simultaneously, the Zambian
government continues to abridge fundamental human rights of its
citizens. The solution to the problem lies in a fresh and renewal
commitment to preserve the rights of Zambia's constituents.
C. A New Approach to Human Rights Law in Zambia
As stated earlier, the primary function of any police force is to
facilitate the peaceful and unbridled enjoyment of individual rights
and freedoms in the state. In the execution of these functions, police
LIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED MONDAY JULY 9, 1990, 1 (1990). Though
it focused on the democratization of the ruling party to make it responsive to the
needs of the people, the committee practically endorsed the reintroduction of the
multi-party system of government by eliminating provisions in the Party Constitution
which make it supreme over other institutions in the country. It did not, however,
call for the abolition of the one-party state, but rather indicated that UNIP should
be revamped to face challenges of the movement on multi-party democracy and the




See generally U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. Pi, AC. 1979, at 233;
U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 1980, at 313; U.S. DEP'T ST.
COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAc. 1982, at 360; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM.
RTS. PRAC. 1983, at 421; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1984,
at 381; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1985, at 381; U.S. DEP'T
ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAc. 1987, at 349; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP.
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988, at 412.
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must balance the competing interests of individual rights with the
derivative rights and interests of the state. Balancing the two sets of
values is the subject of the restrictions on human rights in article 26
of the Constitution. 97 Under this article, fundamental human rights
are subjected to powers of police and state security forces in the
event of war or national emergency under article 30 of the Consti-
tution.9 Typically, article 30 is applied in regard to detention. 99
Therefore, the security and peaceful enjoyment of fundamental
rights are subordinated to the mandate of police and state security
forces under the Zambian regimes. Since the mandate of police power
is constitutional, both the police and state security forces must strictly
comply with the law in exercising their authority. Case law in which
Zambian courts have succinctly elucidated on this principle has been
alluded to above.100
From the perspective of human rights law in Zambia, vis-a-vis the
specific mandate of police power and also the general attributes of
rights and powers of a sovereign state, the complete and unabridged
enjoyment of rights must be protected, even where purposes of na-
tional security, public order, defense, public safety, public morality,
or any such actions or laws are involved.
The issue of laws restrictive of fundamental human rights, yet not
unreasonable, is a conceptual misnomer in a democratic society. First,
from a regulatory point of view, this formulation shifts the burden
from the state to the victim, whose rights have been infringed, to
97 ZAMBIA CONST. art. 26.
,a Id. art. 30.
Legislative history of the law on emergencies and preservation of public security
goes back to the period immediately before the independence of Zambia. On the
attainment of independence, the President assumed full executive powers similar to
those enjoyed by his predecessor. These powers included detention powers which
are delegable to appropriate police officers and state security forces. These powers
had been invoked by the colonial governor three months before independence to
deal with the Lumpa-Lenshina Mulenga uprisings in the eastern and northern portions
of the country. Pursuant to section 5(3) of the Preservation of Public Security Act,
Parliament is empowered to extend declarations of the colonial governor now vested
in the President. Under this authority, the Governor's declaration on the Lumpa-
Lenshina Mulenga uprisings continued into the present. It can be revoked by the
President or the National Assembly, or it lapses within seven days of a new President
assuming power other than the incumbent in power according to the Constitution
(Amendment) Act, No. 5 Z. GOV'T GAzETTE 189 (Supp. 1969). Detention powers
contained in the Preservation of Public Security Act have been used to respond to
various situations ranging from conditions of liberation wars, political instability,
and purely criminal activities.
'0 See supra footnotes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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show cause why the state should not violate his rights. This burden
supports the postulation that the state usurps rights that are properly
vested in the individual.
Second, the only state action reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society is a valid and legitimate one under fundamental human rights
provisions. If such action or law contradicts these provisions, it must
inherently offend notions of democracy.
Third, democracy symbolizes a government by the people, essen-
tially a government whereby primordial authority is vested in the
people to be exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system
of representation reflected in a free electoral process. This concept
differs markedly from democratic centrism, a feature of any one-
party state in which party members participate in policy discussions
at all levels. 10' The one-party system is more closely related to prin-
ciples of oligarchy than to the traditional concept of democracy. As
such, two contradictory principles cannot form the basis for dimin-
ishing rights and freedoms in specific cases.
Fourth, a postulation that the "participatory" disposition of the
Zambian one-party state rendered it more in line with attributes of
democracy and therefore justifies restrictions of basic rights if state
action is necessary in a democratic society, is neutralized by the
essence of the concept of democracy itself, namely the unrestricted
freedom of people to self govern. Their representatives in government
constitute their agents. Since the people have declared their basic
rights and freedom under articles 13 through 26 of the Constitution
to be fundamental, the state lacks authority to vest in itself the right
to serve purported interests of the state by limiting democracy.
The commitment to complete enjoyment of fundamental human
rights as expressed under articles 13 through 26 of the Constitution,
as long as they do not impinge on the rights of others, stems from
the proposition that policy justifications limiting complete enjoyment
of basic rights and freedoms constitute second-tier'cu prescriptive norms
already addressed by laws, rules, and regulations of public order.
The legitimacy and authority of these limitations are from consti-
tutional norms. However, these norms were not designed to supersede
,0, Members of the party and the nation as a whole are, by the nature of the
system itself, required to follow decisions ultimately made by the Central Committee
of the Party and the Office of the President.
102 "Second-tier" means the secondary level of formulating norms of laws governing
societal conduct, distinguished from the primary or organic levels upon which norms
of fundamental human rights are created.
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or override the inherent enjoyment of basic rights contained in the
Constitution.
There should be a commitment to full enjoyment of basic rights
and freedoms formulated and recognized in the Constitution, except
where they transgress the rights of others. Therefore, fundamental
human rights are not about torture, inhuman treatment, or detention
by state sanction, but instead represent an affirmation of the sanctity
of life through law. Any articulation by the state to justify their
preemption in specified cases under the guise of state sovereignty
inherently undermines these fundamental principles.
If these basic rights and freedoms are considered derogable or
revocable at the whim of the state, then it would follow that death,
torture, and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment or punish-
ment would be conscionable in those state-justified circumstances.
This view is erroneous and not constitutionally sound. The goal is
just the opposite, namely to formulate and enshrine these natural
rights recognized as safeguards against any abuse, erosion or abridge-
ment. Abuse of human rights is the same whether it occurs overtly
through a tangible display of force by individuals, or by instruments
of the state to carry out prohibited actions in the name of national
security, defense, public order or other policy considerations. If it is
illegal for individuals to derogate fundamental human rights, it is
also wrong for state instruments of power to do so. The Constitution
represents an independent power base to govern the diversity of
Zambia's citizens and promote the uniqueness of individuality. 0 3 The
Constitution is based on fundamental human rights, as reposed in
the individual. Since constitutional foundation represents the collective
will of the people, humanity at this level cannot be diminished in
any way. Any such attempt conceptually leaves the entire constitu-
tional mechanism in disarray because the power base upon which it
was founded has been eroded. Constitutional preemption of basic
individual rights treads on this delicate and most fundamental tenet
of organized society. Therefore, legal circumstances do not exist where
it is proper to reduce, restrict, or take away fundamental human
rights. Moreover, preemption may not be inserted in the organic law
to strip such rights. The Constitution cannot sanction the demise of
life in deference to expansive modalities of state rights.' °4 There are
,o0 See generally Mwalimu, supra note 4, at 157.
10 As of 1988, 28 countries objected to the death penalty, 18 others allowed it
for very exceptional criminal activities only, and 128 countries permitted it for
[Vol. 21:217
ZAMB]IN HuMAN RIGHTS
no state rights without fundamental human rights, including rights
of those who have been delegated to govern or direct the state's
course.
The process and practice of punishment in the case of wrongdoing
is justified. In practice, these functions must necessarily be secondary
under the wide umbrella of policy justifications. The bond of hu-
manity is cemented by this consent to be bound by societal norms.
Those who do not consent prima-facie are not bound and by im-
plication must find a different level of consent or face expulsion
from one society to another. Incidents of dissent in various societies
and the courage of "dissidents" testify to this proposition. Until they
have found an association or polity with whom they can forge a new
compact, they may as well remain stateless. Therefore, no criminal
act or civil wrong should be committed against anyone protected by
this compact as generally manifested in the constitution, custom, or
tradition holding a particular society together. Anyone in contraven-
tion of this compact is subject to the domain of state sovereignty as
the only agent permitted by the collective will of the people to enforce
and oversee the sanctity of individual rights expressed in the consti-
tution. Under the second-tier permitting state or governmental action,
sanctions against those engaging in recalcitrant behavior are properly
within the ambit of rights and interests of a state. However, the state
can only carry out and execute these functions to the extent that the
Constitution of Zambia permits. Fundamental human rights, or the
Bill of Rights as the case may be, are the only portion of the
Constitution fundamentally prohibited from being infringed upon by
anyone, including the state itself. The converse must be considered
sound-that the state, being the preeminent agent of the collective
will of the people, must ensure that recognition of these fundamental
rights and freedoms are respected at all times by both the state and
the individual. Such is the solemnity of fundamental human rights.
Government is established for the preservation of rights of citizens
and other inhabitants in society. From the preservation of their rights,
state rights and interests are founded and secured. A government
established for purposes other than the security of citizens' rights
lacks the mandate to rule. Therefore, violation of fundamental human
rights by state instruments directly and immediately ruptures gov-
ordinary and exceptional crimes. Practically all of Africa falls in the last category
allowing capital punishment. For details, see LAW LmBARY oF CoNGREss, FoREIGN
LAW SURVEYS, CAPITAL PuNIsHmENT 1 (August 1988).
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ernmental authority and legitimacy. Concurrently, any government
which does not realize the essence of fundamental human rights as
its base of authority is similarly culpable and negligent in the duty
of a government to secure and safeguard the fundamentality of basic
rights of the individual.
Basic or fundamental human rights of the individual are traced to
natural and inalienable rights common to all, preserved and collected
in the most fundamental form. The Constitution upon its creation
finds them already in full bloom, original and fundamental. Pre-
existence of a conglomerate of these rights prior to societal organi-
zation demands that the role of the Constitution be confined to
recognition, preservation, respect and enforcement of these rights.
This is necessary to recognize the imperfections in any structural
edifice of humanity.
Therefore, the Constitution, representative of the collective will of
the people, can do no more than ensure that the commonality of
power in each and every individual is embodied in this instrument
to ensure the complete exercise of rights. This equality must preserve
the sanctity of the human person rather than an imposition of the
will of the state over and above individual rights. State rights and
interests must remain cognizant of their original source and be de-
rivative of individual rights collected in an instrument representative
of their collective will. Individual rights must be sanctified. Only in
preservation, recognition and enforcement of human rights can the
Constitution truly be the organic and fundamental law of the land.
It is also unsound for a basic law to secure and guarantee rights
on one hand and essentially deny them on the other. These rights
must be balanced in a court of law under a process requisite for a
determination of breach.
The government cannot justify derogation of fundamental rights
due to extraordinary circumstances contained in the Constitution. The
government may take action through powers properly issued under
the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not bargainable or nego-
tiated in the Constitution, otherwise there would be no need for
subordinate laws upon which policy finds expression. Rights are
bargained and negotiated outside the Constitution, as legislators look
into this instrument for guidance. Alternatively, they may be bar-
gained while looking to the Constitution for direction. Therefore,
any government and its operatives functioning under the rule of law
must be subjected to this proposition. Those who violate the law
tread on this delicate and important protective shield of the individual
against state incursions into his or her private life and also against
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transgressions of others in society. Breach of norms occurs at various
levels in the interaction of society giving rise to functional consti-
tutionalism. These include breaches by organized polities themselves.
Whether breach occurs due to individual or state transgressions, the
transgressors must be ascertained and sanctioned. As such, the gov-
ernment cannot, as a privilege of the state, constitutionally deprive
another person of their natural rights. This premise stems from the
fact that fundamental human rights contained in the Constitution of
Zambia, as in other sub-Saharan African countries, are superimposed
over and above all other constitutional norms and subordinate laws
issued under them. 05 Law is for order and peace and not for violence
and destruction.
Consequently, no phrase better signifies the unity of individuals
than "we the people." The fact that the people themselves have
united to create an organization, association or entity to be governed
under the rule of law signifies the supremacy of the organic law of
the land, namely the Constitution, custom or practice upon which
society is founded. In essence, the source of fundamentality of human
os See, e.g., articles 3 to 19 on fundamental human rights of the Constitution of
Mauritius, 1968 as amended, 1 REv. L. MAUITrUS 5 (1981); articles 11-26 of the
Constitution of Liberia on fundamental human rights, BLAUSTEIN & KITTY, Liberia
in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORMD 1, 18 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H.
Flanz eds. Supp. September 1985); the preamble to the Constitution of Seychelles,
1979 as amended, OLSON & PRICE, Republic of Seychelles in CONsTrrUTIoNs OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD i-xii & 1, 14 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
July 1983). The Seychelles preamble enumerates fundamental rights in the Consti-
tution. Although this is a good example of commencement of basic rights provisions
in the first part of the constitutional document, they are declaratory rather than
justiciable. Fundamental human rights are not a declaration of intention as the
Seychelles Constitution indicates, but rather the very basis of the constitutional
mechanism of the state. For examples on limitations of fundamental human rights
by constitutions of sub-Saharan Africa, see generally EwEzuKWA, LESSICK & KEENER,
Nigeria in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTmIES OF THE WORLD 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein
& G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. June 1987); JoNES, SAWYERR & FERRIS, Sierra Leone in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTImS OF THE WORLD, 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein & G.H.
Flanz eds. Supp. June 1989); LARIN & KuKUBO, Botswana in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE CoUT mIES OF TIE WORLD 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
June 1985); BLAUSTEIN & HOLT, Gambia in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1983); BLAusTEIN, MENEZES
& RUSH, Kenya in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUTRmIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein
& G.H. Flanz eds. September 1988); RUSH & HACKWILL, Zimbabwe in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
September 1987); KAKOOZA, KIAPI, HOLT & KEENER, Uganda in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. September
1986).
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rights in the constitution stems from the recognition of "we the
people." This phrase is not synonymous exclusively with group rights
but is also a fundamental predication of the human aspect of the
individual as the basis of state creation.
Conceptually, even the proposition that these constitutions set against
themselves is inherently flawed, because there is only one source to
predicate enjoyment, namely the organic norms of fundamental hu-
man rights. Since fundamental organic norms cannot be used against
themselves to prescribe and formulate liability, they must be tested
against something else in the Constitution more superior than fun-
damental human rights. However, there is nothing more fundamental
than basic human rights through which the state's rights and interests
are founded; therefore, fundamental human rights must serve as the
unrestricted source for all other norms.
The current state of emergency leads to excessive use of dentention
powers. The use of emergency powers must be constrained and nar-
rowly restricted to legitimate applications of national security. How-
ever, judicial review of these powers ensures redress for wrongful
application. This practice must be vigilantly pursued. It is vital that
police and state security forces be made fully cognizant of the value
of respect for the human rights tradition. Prisoners' fundamental
human rights must be preserved at all times. Police and state security
forces constitute societal agents, and in their dealings with the anti-
social elements they must articulate and reflect the highest sense of
honor and values of the law-abiding elements of society. Therefore,
one of the primary reflections of the law enforcement function is to
accentuate the positive attributes of compliance to norms of a civil
society. As much as penal sanctions are necessary, they must be
subordinate to the principles of rehabilitation and the need to prepare
a perpetrator for reentry into society.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, an examination of human rights practices indicates a
general respect for human rights in Zambia, but also reveals a con-
sistent disregard of the rights of prisoners and detainees during the
course of arrest or interrogations, especially in cases pertaining to
national security. Reports of the use of brutal force and other inhuman
treatment of prisoners and detainees have been documented.1 6 Fur-
106 See supra note 96.
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thermore, documented reports of unsanitary conditions, understaff-
ing, and overpopulation in prisons constitute potential or actual
grounds of abuse of inmate rights. These must be remedied through
citizen awareness programs and the disciplining of offending officers
through administration and criminal sanctions, including dismissal
from public service and prison terms.
However, no government program concerning the proper interaction
between law enforcement agents and the general public can succeed
without the respective understanding and appreciation of individual
human rights. Since law enforcement agents and the general public
can only respect and protect that which they can understand, an
educated and aware citizen is a valuable asset. If the level of un-
derstanding is minimal, respect will be correspondingly low. Thus,
absent public awareness and understanding of the fundamentality of
the rights enshrined in the Constitution, no amount of government
representation will solve the problem of human rights abuse.
Coincident with public and police awareness of basic human rights
is the issue of accessibility and contact between the public institutions
and the people for whom they are designed to serve. This accessibility
ensures familiarity between the ordinary citizen and government in-
stitututions, especially those units in continuous contact with the
public. Law abiding members of the community must be free to
interact with institutions of state power such as the police and state
security forces. The pride of law enforcement must be reflected in
the proper balance between the security of public institutions and
public accessibility to the same. Only a citizen, unintimidated by the
functions of the state, aware of his rights, and free to interact with
all the instruments of state power, can informatively and effectively
contribute to the development of the national state. Above all, there
is no greater challenge to the success of a government than the need
to ensure the general education of all segments of society regarding
fundamental human rights of the individual.
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